The absence of identity politics in Indonesia’s February presidential polls indicates the recognition that this factor can be a double-edged sword, especially when appealing to a younger electorate that is savvy on social media and seemingly less susceptible to manipulation.
Historically, identity polarisation has played a significant role in Indonesia’s presidential elections, contributing to social tension and division among the populace. However, in the 2024 presidential election, the issue of identity polarisation seemed to carry less weight. This shift was influenced by various factors including the format of the presidential race, the social media literacy of Millennial and Gen Z voters, and the candidates’ strong Islamic credentials.
During the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections, the country witnessed a deep-seated divide between supporters of Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto, often along social and political identity lines such as Muslims versus non-Muslims and secular-nationalists versus pious-militant Muslims. This sharp division raised significant concern among the country’s leaders and populace, as it led to social tension and strained relationships.
These divisions were exacerbated by negative or “black” campaigns used by both sides, which often targeted the candidates’ religious or ethnic backgrounds. However, as the 2024 election approached, the anticipated surge in identity polarisation did not materialize to the extent that was expected.
One significant factor contributing to the decrease in identity politics in the 2024 election was the format of the presidential race, which involved three candidates instead of the traditional two-horse races of the past. This made it more challenging for campaign teams to conduct black campaigns targeting one candidate, as it could potentially benefit the other rival. This encouraged the campaign teams to focus on polishing the image of their preferred candidate pair or promoting their policy programmes.
Additionally, the strong social media literacy of the Millennial and Gen Z voters also played a role in diminishing the impact of identity polarisation. The COVID-19 pandemic had forced people to rely extensively on technology and social media for work and social interactions, making them more discerning when it came to online information. This increased literacy helped them in identifying and avoiding hoaxes and black campaigns during the election period.
Furthermore, all three pairs of candidates had strong Islamic credentials, making religious identity a less effective tool for attacking any candidate. This made it challenging for the campaign teams to use identity politics as heavily as in the two previous elections.
While identity politics were still utilized to some extent in the 2024 election, it was not the central focus. Instead, the campaign teams leveraged it to boost their candidates’ Islamic credentials, such as performing religious pilgrimages and publicly praying in mosques. Exploitation of identity politics was overshadowed by other campaign strategies, and the election saw a decrease in religious and social polarisation.
In conclusion, the 2024 presidential election in Indonesia marked a departure from the prominent identity polarisation of the past. The changing format of the presidential race, the increased social media literacy of the younger generation, and the candidates’ strong Islamic credentials all contributed to this significant shift. As the country continues to evolve, it will be interesting to observe how future elections navigate the delicate balance of identity politics in the ever-changing landscape of Indonesian politics.
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